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8	This	is	one	of	the	areas	through	which	neoliberal	ideas	of	a	de-regulated,	entrepreneurial	economy	has	
influenced	state	policies	during	the	transition.	
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who	are	the	actual	subjects	of	these	policies?	So	far,	I	have	looked	at	Maoist	politics	within	the	
larger	force-field	where	it	has	developed	and	where	it	must	maneuver.	But	the	Maoist	party	is	
itself	a	grand	machinery	with	many	different	organizational	expressions	and	within	this	institu-
tional	framework	the	cultural	dynamics	of	youth	politics	gives	rise	to	yet	a	different	set	of	con-
tradictions	that	build	upon	those	already	examined	but	which	have	other	expressions	and	im-
plications.	As	highlighted	by	the	volume’s	editors,	a	convincing	analysis	of	mobilization	dynam-
ics	should	unfold	around	the	dialectics	between	organizational	modalities	and	individual	in-
volvement.	I	take	this	to	mean	that	organizations	become	actualized	through	the	concrete	
action	of	individuals	just	as	the	latter	are	products	of	their	interaction	with	institutional	life.	In	
Williams’	vocabulary,	it	is	the	site	of	“specialized	practice”.	The	analytical	power	of	this	frame-
work	is	to	suggest	that	mobilization	leaves	nothing	unchanged;	these	processes	result	in	the	
emergence	of	new	constellations	of	institutional	culture	that	are	the	unfolding	product	of	the	
meeting	between	powerful	institutional	frameworks	and	the	people	who	are	trying	to	fit	into	
its	nebulous	cloak,	changing	it	as	they	go	along.	There	is	this	constant	work	of	submission	
paired	with	a	pushing	at	the	boundaries,	willed	or	unwilled,	that	account	for	the	gradual	dis-
mantling	of	one	organizational	modality	and	the	slow	emergence	of	new	formations.	
For	the	CPN-M	the	external	pressure	of	moving	from	war	to	peace	and	the	growth	of	
its	cadre	base	in	the	urban	areas	led	to	some	minor	organizational	changes	but	actually	these	
were	surprisingly	few	(ICG	2010;	Hachhethu	2008;	Adhikari	2010).	The	rise	of	the	YCL	as	a	sub-
stitution	for	the	loss	of	its	army,	the	People’s	Liberation	Army	(PLA),	constituted	the	major	
institutional	change	and	new	members	joining	the	movement	became	part	of	an	organization-
al	framework	and	party	culture	with	a	proven	structure	that	was	sought	extended	into	the	
post-war	framework	with	as	few	changes	as	possible.	To	accomplish	this	continuity,	the	CPN-M	
used	experienced	leaders	from	the	war	to	lead	new	organizational	cells	and	new	cadres	joining	
were	therefore	supervised	by	members	with	a	solid	history	in	the	movement.	The	leader	of	
Rohit	and	Himal,	for	instance,	was	a	veteran	from	the	PLA,	who	had	already	served	as	a	com-
mander	in	the	war	and	he	was	backed	by	another	long-time	CPN-M	member.	While	data	on	
the	ratio	between	war	and	post-war	members	is	unfortunately	not	available	for	the	YCL,	I	only	
met	leaders	who	had	joined	before	the	peace	agreement	and	who	had,	for	the	most	part,	ac-
tively	participated	in	the	People’s	War.	
What,	then,	characterized	this	organizational	framework?	CPN-M	is	built	like	a	classic	
communist	party	with	a	central	party	committee	over-seeing	all	important	decisions	and	a	
fine-grained	layer	of	committees	below	that	carry	out	orders	from	above	(Rawal	2007;	Thapa	
2003;	Gersony	2003;	Lawoti	and	Pahari	2010).	To	ensure	vertical	integration,	leaders	of	one	
committee	are	at	the	same	time	members	of	the	committee	above	them	from	where	they	
receive	their	orders.	Keeping	with	the	Leninist	principle	of	‘democratic	centralism’,	the	CPN-M	
encourages	bottom-up	feedback	on	all	levels	but	expects	cadres	to	carry	out	orders	without	
questioning	them	because	only	then	can	complex	political	adjustments	be	effectively	imple-
mented	throughout	the	entire	organization.	This	structure	meant	there	was	very	little	negotia-
tion	over	authority	and	also	very	limited	ambiguity,	the	goal	being	transparency	and	uniformi-
ty.	In	fact,	in	an	organizational	culture	with	a	history	of	secrecy	and	thus	without	resort	to	writ-
ten	records,	leaders	sought	to	verbally	copy	the	direction	they	received	from	above	when	re-
laying	messages	thus	depersonalizing	leadership	roles	as	much	as	possible.	
CPN-M’s	authority-structure	was	in	crucial	ways	at	odds	with	how	authority	is	tradi-
tionally	practised	in	Nepali	society	and	while	it	may	seem	bland	to	Western	readers	where	this	
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sort	of	functional	hierarchy	is	well	institutionalized,	it	appeared	quite	exotic	to	new	members:	
“Here,	we	really	have	to	submit	ourselves	to	the	leaders,”	cadres	explained,	not	without	some	
amusement,	“and	we	have	to	obey	their	orders;	they	command	and	we	do.”	Not	used	to	tak-
ing	commands	very	seriously,	even	if	people	in	contexts	outside	the	party	were	seeking	to	
impose	their	authority	in	similar	ways,	they	suddenly	had	to	learn	the	art,	not	of	subtle	evasion	
that	has	been	identified	with	classical	forms	of	resistance	in	Nepali	society	(Gellner	2003;	
Kondos	1994),	but	of	obeying;	directly	and	without	flinching.	As	Talal	Asad	has	also	described	
for	medieval	monks	in	Europe	(1993),	obedience	in	the	CPN-M	amounted	to	a	virtue.	
What	is	interesting	is	how	cadres	nonetheless	experienced	that	they	were	treated	with	
respect,	despite	their	junior	positions,	and	even	as	equals	of	sorts.	A	young	Tamang	woman,	
Damina,	had	come	from	a	small	village	within	the	Kathmandu	valley	and	had	wished	to	escape	
the	boredom	of	farm	work	and	the	predictable	life-path	of	a	low-caste	woman	from	a	family	of	
few	means.	She	had	found	a	job	at	a	garment	factory	on	the	eastern	end	of	the	city	where	she	
was	engaged	for	several	years	and	where	she	built	up	close	relationships	to	some	of	the	other	
women	working	there.	One	of	her	‘sisters’,	as	she	called	her	close	friends	from	the	factory,	had	
recently	joined	the	YCL	and	slowly	afterwards,	she	wanted	to	give	it	a	try	too.	She	soon	mar-
veled	at	the	small	changes	that	cadre	life	in	the	movement	brought	her:	there	seemed	to	be	
no	distinction	between	the	boys	and	girls	in	the	kind	of	assignment	they	received	and	while	
she	was	clearly	aware	of	her	junior	position	in	the	party	and	often	strained	by	the	complexity	
of	work	compared	to	her	experience	from	the	factory,	leaders	spoke	to	her	in	a	much	more	
respectful	tone	than	she	had	been	used	to	both	in	the	village	and	the	factory.	She	was	spoken	
to	using	the	formal	“You”	form	(tapaai)	and	only	rarely	scolded:	“we	are	treated	equally	to	the	
boys”,	she	explained,	“and	when	I	present	myself	in	public,	I	can	say	I	am	a	Maoist	cadre	
(maobaadi	kariyakatra).	
These	were	in	many	ways	small	changes	but	they	carried	important	implications	for	
the	subtle	shifts	in	structures	of	authority	that	accompanied	membership	in	the	CPN-M.	There	
was	a	widespread	sensation	throughout	the	organization	that	the	space	of	relationships,	while	
vertical	in	its	command	structure,	was	empowering	in	ways	that	the	young	members	did	not	
experience	in	their	relationship	outside	the	party;	here	they	were	subject	to	the	engrained	
authority	of	their	elder	kin	and	the	abuse	of	managers	in	the	workplace,	as	well	as	in	urban	
space	in	general	where	they	could	not	assert	themselves	with	their	low-caste	background,	as	
poor,	and	being	young	at	the	same	time.	Within	the	party,	however,	a	distinction	was	drawn	
between	traditional	forms	of	authority	that	were	based	on	experiences	of	inferiority	on	the	
one	hand,	and	party	authority	on	the	other	hand,	that	was	seen	as	fair	and	transparent,	even	if	
strict.	Even	more	importantly,	this	form	of	authority	was	dynamic,	based	on	individual	experi-
ence	rather	than	inflexible	status	or	age	categories;	authority	was	not	tied	to	persons,	it	was	
tied	instead	to	positions	through	which	members	flowed	with	growing	experience.	For	Damina	
this	meant,	for	instance,	that	already	after	a	year	in	the	movement	she	was	given	her	own	
small	team	of	newcomers	to	command	–	relaying	messages	obediently	from	her	leaders	above	
–	even	though	she	was	a	woman	and	some	of	the	new	members	she	commanded	were	in	fact	
older	than	herself.	Such	distributions	of	authority	and	gaining	of	worth	contained	a	contrast	to	
old	structure	of	power	and	created	commitments	to	the	Maoist	future.	Most	importantly,	it	
nurtured	cadres	with	a	sense	that	their	mobilization	carried	potentials	for	political	transfor-
mation	and	were	more	than	empty	gestures.	
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Partial	inclusion	and	youth	contradictions	
CPN-M	members	thus	became	engaged	through	a	dynamic	authority	structure	that	allowed	for	
the	growth	of	individual	careers	without	jeopardizing	the	top-down	command	structure	of	the	
party,	at	least	at	the	entry-level	where	there	was	little	room	for	abuse	of	power.	On	this	level,	
it	really	seemed	as	if	the	YCL’s	slogan	of	youth	empowerment	carried	some	traction	and	al-
lowed	for	new	experiences	of	cadreship	within	a	political	space	that	was	slowly	undergoing	
transformation	towards	a	new	and	different	patrimonial	future.	The	new	cadres	who	joined	
the	Maoists	in	the	post-war	years,	however,	had	other	identities	than	merely	those	of	youth	
that	seeped	into	the	movement	and	reflected	CPN-M’s	complicated	position	in	the	public	
landscape.	
With	the	levelling	of	members’	sociocultural	markers	into	a	generalized	category	as	
maobaadi	–	the	pride	of	Damini’s	new	identity	–	also	came	a	silencing	of	identities	that	were	
traversed	by	differential	privileges.	There	was	a	very	perceptible	distribution	of	jaati	(caste	and	
ethnicity)	marked	bodies	across	CPN-M’s	party	structure	with	the	central	leadership	consisting	
almost	entirely	of	high-caste	Hindus	and	the	party’s	fringes	populated,	in	turn,	by	marginalized	
population	groups	such	as	Tamangs,	Rai	and	others.	During	the	growth	of	the	movement	in	the	
war	period,	the	leadership	built	alliances	with	and	encouraged	the	formation	of,	ethnic	fronts	
fighting	for	political	inclusion	in	a	polity	ruled	by	Brahmins	and,	to	some	extent,	Chettris	(see	
de	Sales	2000;	Lecomte-Tilouine	2004).	The	Maoist	leadership	itself,	having	evolved	from	
Kathmandu’s	intellectual	elite,	was	almost	exclusively	upper-caste	as	well.	After	the	war,	it	
came	to	a	split	in	the	movement	when	its	high-caste	leaders	were	unwilling	to	pursue	identity	
issues	in	their	bid	for	rule,	and	this	led	to	the	complete	silencing	of	identity	within	the	move-
ment.	“Here,	we	do	not	speak	of	jaat”,	was	the	answer	I	would	get	when	broaching	the	subject	
and	sometimes	I	was	offered	an	expanded	version	that	“we	do	not	judge	each	other	based	on	
caste.”	This	anti-discriminatory	stance,	while	clearly	breaking	with	widespread	caste-rules	on	
interaction	between	differentially	positioned	groups,	thus	also	had	the	effect	of	actively	silenc-
ing	the	perpetuation	of	deep	divergences	in	who	had	access	to	the	party’s	central	commands.	
Similar	criticism	have	been	levied	against	the	party’s	gender	policy	which	looks	good	on	paper	
–	and	in	the	everyday	interaction	between	cadres	–	but	which	does	not	translate	into	women	
attaining	leadership	positions	(Manchanda	2004;	Gautam	et	al	2003;	Gayer	2013).	
While	these	discrepancies	of	inclusion	seem	at	first	hand	to	be	the	outcome	of	an	
identity-blind	policy,	there	are	indicators	that	these	institutional	inequalities	have	a	deeper	
subterranean	current	revolving	around	class.	Behind	the	differences	of	jaat	and	gender	lures	
the	question	of	education,	which	seems	to	be	dividing	members	internally	in	the	CPN-M’s	dif-
ferent	organizations	and	between	them.	While	there	are	more	than	two	handful	‘sister	organi-
zations’	within	the	umbrella	of	the	CPN-M	catering	to	different	occupational	sectors,	ethnic	
groups	and	so	on,	the	CPN-M	student	union,	the	ANNISU-R,	carries	a	special	status	(see	
Snellinger	2009a;	2007).	ANNISU-R	organizes	the	educated	middle-class	(and	usually	high-
caste)	and	mobilizes	them	to	career	politics,	as	they	go	on	to	become	leaders	in	the	CPN-M	
(though	not	without	problems,	see	Snellinger	2009b).	By	contrast,	the	youth	in	YCL,	most	of	
whom	are	uneducated	and	many	even	illiterate	when	they	enter	the	party,	remain	outside	the	
bounds	of	influential	party	positions.	During	the	war,	the	space	for	participation	of	lower	clas-
ses	in	forming	the	movement	was	made	possible	through	the	armed	wing	(Lecomte-Tilouine	
2013),	but	in	the	context	of	peace	it	seemed	the	CPN-M	has	developed	into	a	meritocratic	
principle	of	differentiation.	While	this	can	be	broached	as	a	class	neutral	option	in	contexts	of	
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a	successful	education	system,	in	Nepal	where	caste	and	class	privileges	translate	directly	into	
a	stratification	of	educational	options,	such	a	policy	risks	simply	replacing	one	kind	of	divide	
(gerontological)	with	another	(class).	Maoist	leaders	easily	reproduce	this	institutional	regime	
when	they	refer	to	the	YCL	as	“the	cadre	factory	of	the	party”,	acknowledging	its	importance	
for	supplying	the	power	of	numbers	but	failing	to	offer	an	option	for	integrating	class-
marginalized	youth	into	a	party	culture	stratified	according	to	educational	achievement.	
The	consequence	of	the	structural	blindness	of	class	politics	within	the	party	registers	
on	the	unfolding	cultural	politics	of	youth	within	YCL.	In	the	absence	of	discourses	on	caste,	
gender,	ethnicity	and	class,	the	cultural	formation	of	youth	comes	to	carry	the	weight	of	iden-
tifying	the	aspiration	of	cadres.	As	“progressive	youth”,	cadres	were	given	space	to	participate	
at	the	bottom	of	the	institutional	hierarchy	and	in	the	margin	of	the	political	field	through	a	
formal	hierarchy	that	was	in	principle	flexible	enough	to	allow	the	gradual	ascendancy	of	
members	as	their	experience	grew.	
But	youth	was	also	tamed,	and	subsumed,	within	the	larger	political	economy	of	Mao-
ist	party	building.	As	juniors	in	the	movement,	senior	members	easily	slipped	into	familiar	
forms	of	address	prevalent	in	Nepali	society,	including	in	the	political	culture	from	which	the	
Maoist	is	seeking	to	distance	itself,	of	sibling-relations.	Junior	members,	while	officially	just	
“comrades”	were	often	addressed	as	“younger	sister”	(bahini)	or	“younger	brother”	(bai)	and,	
in	turn,	youth	would	call	their	seniors	by	the	corresponding,	and	venerable,	terms	for	“elder	
sister”	(didi)	or	“elder	brother”	(dai).	These	were	seemingly	innocent	expressions	of	the	inti-
mate	relationships	that	developed	between	cadres	who	spent	most	of	their	time	together	but	
it	constituted	at	the	same	time	another	slippage	away	from	the	politics	of	equality	and	indicat-
ed	the	difficulty	with	which	the	CPN-M	held	onto	its	efforts	at	building	an	efficient	counter-
culture;	hegemonic	forms	of	social	distinction	and	political	reproduction	continuously	crept	in	
through	the	pores	of	the	party	and	came	to	constitute	a	new	patrimony.	
At	the	same	time,	blindness	towards	the	real	generators	of	political	exclusion	invested	
the	identification	of	youth	with	some	of	the	power	of	misrecognition.	While	youth	politics	in	
the	party	became	a	way	to	hide	the	lacking	inclusion	of	class	discrepancies,	this	at	the	same	
time	unleashed	its	power	as	a	master	signifier	around	which	struggles	for	change	revolved.	
This	had	curious	and	unintended	consequences	for	YCL	party	culture	as	cadres	began	to	identi-
fy	youth	with	a	psychological	state	of	mind	and	started	developing	a	self-disciplining	regime	
around	ideas	of	“proper”	and	“revolutionary”	youth.	Cadres	took	pride	in	the	ethics	of	frugal	
living	–	adopting	the	first	half	of	a	popular	CPN-M	slogan	“simple	living,	high	thinking”	–	and	
sought	to	distance	themselves	from	people,	and	in	particular	other	youth,	who	failed	to	com-
mit	to	the	ethics	of	simplicity.	As	if	cadres	were	punishing	themselves	from	being	poor,	an	
internal	and	bizarre	competition	between	cadres	was	visible	during	my	fieldwork	where	“lust”	
for	money,	untamed	desires	of	consumption	and	sexual	relationships,	and	strong	attachments	
to	family	and	friends	joined	in	a	curious	mixture	of	self-flagellation	and	cultural	criticism.	Rohit,	
for	instance,	was	worried	about	how	to	build	his	body	in	this	image,	to	look	strong	but	not	
vain;	Himal	wrote	poetry	and	trained	his	ability	to	express	feelings	of	happiness	whereas	Dam-
it,	on	the	other	hand,	returned	to	her	village	at	some	point	and	was	instantly	criticized	by	her	
closest	friend	–	the	‘sister’	that	had	motivated	her	to	join	–	about	her	inability	to	shed	with	the	
desire	for	“luxury”	and	her	filial	attachment	to	the	family.	
In	the	process	of	concretizing	the	new	youth	culture	that	the	CPN-M	was	formulating	
on	a	political	level,	YCL	members	developed	the	dynamics	of	competing	cultural	formations	in	
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new	directions.	When	we	look	dialectically	at	the	idea	of	youth	that	developed	in	the	YCL,	it	
opens	up	into	two	forms:	one	that	carries	promises	of	empowerment	and	is	a	force	of	potenti-
ality,	and	another	which	covers	up	the	simultaneous	disappearance	of	ethnic,	caste,	gender	
and	class	markers	within	the	organization.	In	the	meeting	of	these	two	moments	of	youth,	one	
liberating	and	another	suppressed,	YCL’s	distinct	development	of	a	cadre	culture	took	form	
and	this	gave	shape	to	the	larger	struggle	over	cultural	formations	waged	in	the	political	
sphere.	The	curious	outcome	of	this	development	was	that	the	youth	culture	through	which	
cadres	were	mobilized	and	integrated	became	transformed	and	turned	into	a	recipe	for	a	self-
disciplining	which	had	very	little	to	do	with	CPN-M’s	political	struggle	but	which	positioned	
itself	actively	with	regards	to	competing	urban	youth	cultures.	Thus	in	the	actual	practices	of	
cadreship,	the	content	of	the	struggle	between	the	dominant	and	the	subversive	is	given	form	
and	develops	in	a	different	direction	than	what	was	envisioned	by	its	leaders.		
The	confrontation	between	emergent	and	dynamic	forms	has	thus	not	only	been	be-
tween	the	Maoist	and	the	political	establishment	but	a	battle	fought	within	the	party	over	
questions	of	authority.	The	Maoist	elaboration	of	the	role	of	youth	in	political	culture	owes	
more,	in	fact,	to	the	patriarchal	tradition	of	caste-divided	Nepal	with	the	idea	of	social	service	
and	the	necessity	of	youth	to	achieve	training	by	seniors	before	acquiring	authority	on	their	
own.	The	youth	politics	practiced	in	the	CPN-M	is	in	opposition	more	directly	to	the	consumer-
ist	capitalist	youth	culture	even	though	its	political	rhetoric	focuses	on	the	gerontocratic	and	
elite-based	political	establishment.	This	shows	that	even	Williams’	vocabulary,	in	the	context	
of	alter-political	mobilization,	cannot	be	applied	without	a	concrete	dialectical	reading	of	the	
complex	relationship	between	formations	of	different	political	cultures.	Maoist	formations	of	
youth	is	“emergent”	on	the	one	hand,	in	relationship	to	a	high-caste,	urban	and	age-based	
autocratic	elite	and	it	is	“oppositional”	to	a	market-based	middle-class	culture	but	it	is	also	
“residual”	with	regards	to	the	recycling	of	traditional	notions	of	parental	authority.	This	com-
plicates	the	notion	that	Maoist	mobilization	simply	succeeds	by	offering	an	alternative	pre-
scription	for	membership,	as	the	evolving	dynamic	between	differently	positioned	political	
cultures	–	Hindu,	urban	and	kin-related	–	create	shifting	horizons	within	which	Maoism	is	lo-
cated	and	seeks	to	navigate.		
Conclusion	
The	CPN-M,	and	the	YCL	in	particular,	was	caught	in	a	three-way	struggle	against	both	the	
competing	consumerist	ideas	of	youth	and	the	remittance	economy.	As	party	members,	they	
were	opposing	class	enemies	that	they	had	no	relation	to,	i.e.	high-caste	elites;	as	poor	youth	
in	a	remittance	economy,	they	were	seeking	to	distance	themselves	from	ties	of	kinship	and	
this,	by	contrast,	involved	a	very	concrete	rupture	of	experience;	but	then	as	city	youth,	they	
were	disciplining	an	opposition	to	the,	largely,	middle-class	economy	of	consumption	and	lei-
sure	and	this	constituted	a	‘translation’,	and	displacement,	of	the	neoliberal	ideology	of	mar-
ket-driven	development	from	an	economic	to	a	cultural	realm	of	behavior.	
Problematics	of	mobilization	to	violent	movements	continue	to	haunt	the	political	es-
tablishment,	particularly	in	the	west	where	the	threat	of	“terrorism”	poses	complicated	and,	
also	sometimes,	uncomfortable	questions	about	the	“all-too-familiar”	nature	of	people	who	
find	themselves	at	the	forefront	of	apocalyptic	events.	In	the	context	of	Nepal,	the	YCL	was	
also	deemed	too	radical	for	a	party	that	was	trying	to	accede	to	a	liberal	political	framework,	
and	was	effectively	ostracized	and	“left	to	die”.	In	this	chapter,	I	have	tried	to	think	about	how	
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violent	political	movements	mobilize	young	people	through	an	examination	of	the	formation	
of	new	youth	cultures	that	have	been	able	to	provide	directional	force	to	ideologically	un-
trained	cadres.	The	analysis	of	youth	presented	here	has	shown	that	far	from	being	a	neutral	
descriptive	category,	youth,	by	contrast,	become	strong	symbolic	figures	growing	out	of	dis-
parate	political	economic	forces.	By	thinking	about	the	political	competitions	within	which	
youth	gets	caught	up,	and	redefined	in	the	process,	I	have	described	Maoist	post-revolutionary	
mobilization	as	a	‘culture	war’	to	indicate	how	the	differences,	values	and	collectivities	identi-
fied	with	youth	became	a	battlefield,	turning	the	question	of	cadres’	future	as	well	into	a	bat-
tlefield.	
As	I	have	argued,	the	mobilization	of	the	working	poor	as	cadres	of	the	party	took	
place	within	several	competing	cultural	formations	that	were	peculiar	to	the	historic	moment	
in	which	Nepali	political	life	found	itself	in	the	immediate	post-revolution	years.	The	rise	of	an	
alternative	political	youth	culture	based	on	new	visions	of	Nepali	society	and	a	willingness	to	
fight	collectively	for	this	vision	resulted	in	the	development	of	contradictory	practices,	as	the	
CPN-M	and	the	YCL	tried	to	concretize	these	ideas	in	an	environment	of	competitive	cultural	
formations.	The	ground	underneath	postwar	political	culture	had	shifted	to	such	a	degree	that	
CPN-M’s	youth	ideas	was	but	the	next	clear	pronunciation	of	a	widespread	(cultural)	criticism	
against	degenerative	party	politics	–	cleptocratic,	corrupt,	even	ideological	blind	–	that	to	
some	extent	the	emergence	of	youth	politics	came	to	be	seen,	by	some,	as	a	form	of	relief.	The	
problematic	of	the	relationship	between	the	dominant,	residual	and	the	alternative	present	
themselves	here	in	a	slightly	more	complex	interlocking	than	proposed	by	Williams	due	to	the	
highly	politically	charged	atmosphere	in	which	CPN-M	politics	unfolded.	Despite	the	power	of	
established	politics,	it	has	slowly	been	losing	its	grip	on	the	claim	to	legitimacy	and,	by	way	
also	of	the	force	of	public	opinion,	the	emergent	youth	culture	of	politics	proposed	by	the	
CPN-M	seeps	into	a	much	wider	space	than	its	own	institutional	boundaries.	The	hegemonic	
itself	seems	to	be	in	decline	and	a	new	matrix	is	opened	up	where	oppositional	politico-
cultural	formations	are	competing	to	become	the	new	hegemony.	
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